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OS security comparison 2026: 14 Linux distributions, Windows 11 24H2, macOS 15 Sequoia, FreeBSD 14 and OpenBSD 7.8 evaluated on MAC, firewall, encryption and rights.
OS Security Panorama 2026: Linux, Windows, macOS, BSD
This comparison now covers three distinct scopes, evaluated on criteria adapted to each OS family.
14 production Linux distributions : evaluation on 7 consistent criteria (v3 corrections included).
3 experimental or specialized Linux distributions : Fedora Rawhide, Debian Sid, Tails — with explicit warnings.
4 other OS : Windows 11 24H2, macOS 15 Sequoia, FreeBSD 14, OpenBSD 7.8 — adapted criteria, comparability discussed.
Linux production comparison table (2026)
v3 corrections: Fedora Workstation reclassified as semi-annual point release (not rolling). NixOS corrected: no active MAC by default (neither SELinux nor AppArmor fully integrated).
| Score | Property & Rights | Firewall |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | Advanced immutable · rollback · structured rights | Active restrictive policy by default |
| 2 | Solid Unix rights + proper sudo | Active standard configuration |
| 1 | Basic few structural mechanisms | Installed but inactive |
| 0 | Weak | Absent |
| Distribution | Level | MAC | FW | Rights | Kernel | Type |
|---|
Linux production profiles
Experimental / targeted use distributions
Important: distributions in this section are not intended for production use. They appear here to complete the panorama, with explicit warnings on each card.
| Distribution | Level | MAC | FW | Rights | Kernel | Type |
|---|
Other OS: Windows, macOS, BSD
Methodology — partial comparability: Windows and macOS are closed source systems; their security mechanisms cannot be independently audited. The criteria below are functional equivalents adapted to each OS. BSD (FreeBSD, OpenBSD) are open source and directly auditable. These OS are not directly comparable to Linux distributions on the same scale.
| OS | Level | Access Control (MAC equiv.) | Firewall | Encryption | System Hardening | Source |
|---|
Section III Analysis
Windows 11 24H2
WDAC • BitLocker • HVCI • VBS
• HVCI, VBS and Secure Boot mandatory.
• BitLocker automatically enabled on a clean install with a Microsoft account on TPM 2.0 hardware.
• Weak point: opaque source code, telemetry difficult to fully disable.
• WDAC (MAC equivalent) exists but its default configuration is less restrictive than SELinux in enforcing mode.
• BitLocker automatically enabled on a clean install with a Microsoft account on TPM 2.0 hardware.
• Weak point: opaque source code, telemetry difficult to fully disable.
• WDAC (MAC equivalent) exists but its default configuration is less restrictive than SELinux in enforcing mode.
macOS 15 Sequoia
SIP • Gatekeeper • App Sandbox • TCC
• SIP blocks any system file modification even with root rights.
• Gatekeeper controls unsigned binaries.
• TCC manages access permissions to sensitive resources.
• Notable weakness: application firewall disabled by default (bugs in macOS 15.0, fixed in 15.1).
• FileVault is optional, not enforced during installation.
• Closed source → independent audit impossible.
• Gatekeeper controls unsigned binaries.
• TCC manages access permissions to sensitive resources.
• Notable weakness: application firewall disabled by default (bugs in macOS 15.0, fixed in 15.1).
• FileVault is optional, not enforced during installation.
• Closed source → independent audit impossible.
OpenBSD 7.8
pledge • unveil • W^X • pf • RETGUARD
• Security reference by default: only OS in this comparison applying W^X (Write XOR Execute) strictly and systemically for over 20 years.
• pledge(2) and unveil(2) reduce exploitation surface even after compromise.
• pf active by default.
• RETGUARD protects return addresses.
• Kernel relinked at each boot.
• Exceptional record: only two remote holes in over 25 years.
• Open source, fully auditable.
• pledge(2) and unveil(2) reduce exploitation surface even after compromise.
• pf active by default.
• RETGUARD protects return addresses.
• Kernel relinked at each boot.
• Exceptional record: only two remote holes in over 25 years.
• Open source, fully auditable.
FreeBSD 14
Jails • pf • ZFS • geli • BSD License
• Jails : strong isolation (kernel containers predating Docker).
• pf (inherited from OpenBSD) is available but not enabled by default.
• Integrated ZFS provides encryption and data integrity.
• CVE-2025-15576 (Feb 2026): flaw in jail subsystem allowing processes from distinct jails to bypass restrictions via nullfs — fixed in FreeBSD 14.3 and 13.5.
• Default security lower than OpenBSD, but FreeBSD excels as server or network appliance with explicit configuration.
• pf (inherited from OpenBSD) is available but not enabled by default.
• Integrated ZFS provides encryption and data integrity.
• CVE-2025-15576 (Feb 2026): flaw in jail subsystem allowing processes from distinct jails to bypass restrictions via nullfs — fixed in FreeBSD 14.3 and 13.5.
• Default security lower than OpenBSD, but FreeBSD excels as server or network appliance with explicit configuration.
Conclusion — Which OS for your profile?
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